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Abstract In developing countries that are democratizing after military rule, and
undergoing liberalizing economic reforms that encourage a shrinking of the state,
what missions are the armed forces performing, who funds those missions, who
benefits from military services, and why? This article analyzes security provision
by the armed forces for paying clients—especially private companies in extractive
industries—in accordance with negotiations between clients and commanders of the
local military units that directly provide the security. The analysis identifies two paths
toward local military–client relations. First, weak state capacity may mean that
government control of military finances brought by democratization and economic
reform remains limited to the national level, promoting local military–client
exchanges. Second, amid minimal government control of military finances, even in
the capital city, demand from companies in the powerful extractive industries and
from recently endowed subnational governments can encourage local military–client
contracting.
Keywords Civil–military relations . Resource conflict . Security privatization . State
capture . Subnational politics
Introduction
In developing countries that are democratizing after military rule, and undergoing
liberalizing economic reforms that encourage a shrinking of the state, what missions
are the armed forces performing, who funds those missions, who benefits from
military services, and why? This article analyzes security provision by the armed
forces for paying clients—especially private companies in extractive industries—in
accordance with negotiations between clients and commanders of the local military
St Comp Int Dev (2013) 48:172–195
DOI 10.1007/s12116-012-9119-2
M. Jaskoski (*)
Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Glasgow Room 396, 1411
Cunningham Road, Monterey, CA 93943, USA
e-mail: majaskos@nps.edu
units that directly provide the security. The analysis identifies and resolves a tension
in the literature. On one hand, economic liberalism and democratization should chip
away at the military’s existing revenues and broaden (and enrich) its private client
base, making entrepreneurship more attractive to the armed forces. However, on the
other hand and complicating military–client relations, enhanced oversight of public
finances is also predicted to accompany liberal economic reform and democracy.
This study takes a local political economy perspective of the Ecuadorian and
Peruvian cases, examining army–client deals on the ground within a larger context
that includes both interactions between local commanders and army leaders, and
political and economic pressures on the armies at the national level. The article shows
that weak state capacity may mean that government control of military finances
brought by democratization and economic reform remains limited to the national
level, promoting local military–client exchanges. The study’s final section applies
this framework to Indonesia and Nigeria. The two short case studies help test the
article’s central argument, and they point to an alternative path leading to local client
influence, enabling us to construct a more comprehensive model of military entre-
preneurship in the developing world.
A Local Political Economy Approach to Third-Party Financing
This analysis bridges three disparate research traditions that have observed private
financing of the armed forces: work on civil–military relations, security privatization,
and natural resource conflict. Specifically, the article addresses discord in the litera-
ture regarding whether or not the current democratic, neoliberal environment fosters
third-party financing of militaries in Latin America, a region that has seen dramatic
economic opening and sweeping democratization in recent decades.
One hypothesis derived from existing research is that neoliberal reforms and
democratization push militaries to look for private clients, by cutting national defense
budgets and expanding the private sector. With regard to the role of neoliberalism,
liberal reforms should increase the power of private companies to purchase military
services, influence that the security privatization literature has underscored. Employ-
ing the logic of the “rentier state,” Avant (2005, pp. 180–181) argues that govern-
ments at the helm of weak states invite private international investors to subsidize
state security forces and, in that way, avoid heavily taxing the public to pay for
security. For their part, private corporations provide the subsidies in the interest of
protecting company operations. While this model is problematic in that it takes for
granted that militaries respond fully to national government decisions when in fact
Latin American armed forces exhibit autonomy in security matters (Pion-Berlin and
Trinkunas 2007), it does draw attention to private transnational companies’ power,
which should be exceptional in Latin America, given the region’s widespread privat-
ization of state-owned enterprises.1 Indeed, Richani (2005) argues that neoliberalism
has fed Colombia’s internal conflict by bringing progressively more profits to private
1 Between 1990 and 1997, proceeds generated from privatization in Latin America and the Caribbean
amounted to over $116.5 billion, or 52.4 % of total privatization revenues of all developing countries
(Corrales 2003, p. 90).
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transnational companies operating in natural resource extraction because, from those
profits, companies have compensated actors on all sides of the conflict, including the
armed forces, for security.
If studies about security privatization and work on resource conflict bring to the
fore how privatization as a component of neoliberalism transfers wealth and thus
power to the private sector, research on Latin American civil–military relations has
described the other side of the same coin: reduced defense spending as part of state
cutbacks that come with liberal economic reforms (Marcella 1994, pp. 14–15; Cruz
and Diamint 1998). Particularly germane to the present analysis, Cruz and Diamint
(1998, see especially 118–119) argue that state downsizing has driven budget-hungry
militaries to market their security services to private companies. The civil–military
relations literature has also brought in democratization as a factor that encourages
military budget cuts over time. Hunter (1997) finds that, following military rule,
politicians seeking election have lowered defense spending relative to more popular
investments, including social programs.
Though perhaps neoliberalism and democratization deplete national defense
spending and lead the newly impoverished Latin American militaries to court the
growing private sector for alternative funding, those same two phenomena could also
advance government control of military finances, which would seem to interfere with
contracts between the military and third parties. By definition, when militaries left
government they formally handed civilians control of state, including military,
finances. Furthermore, it is necessary to monitor military (and more broadly, state)
resources in order to achieve the above-mentioned popular budget allocations and
fiscal discipline supposedly brought on by democratization and economic opening.
As discussed below, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—the loan terms of
which have encouraged and helped define neoliberal policies in the developing
world—has reviewed and induced changes to the Ecuadorian government’s formula
for calculating the national budget. In Peru, we will see that a major part of
democratization from the corrupt, militarized government of the 1990s was that
elected policymakers improved budget transparency, including in the defense sector.
Independent of any transparency brought on by democracy and neoliberalism in
general, democratization following military rule encourages civilians in government
to examine military budgets for another reason, as part of the effort to control the
armed forces in post-transition civil–military power struggles (Stepan 1988, p. 95;
Hunter 1997). In short, each of the two transitions, one, to a market economy, and the
other, to democracy, logically should encourage Latin American armed forces to
obtain third-party funding while also creating roadblocks to such behavior.
To resolve this tension, the following analysis treats the army as a complex
organization in which commanders of local units make decisions. The article posits
that the government will not necessarily be able to monitor those officers or their
units. Whereas classifying countries as having strong or weak states serves Avant’s
analytic purposes, it does not capture how in Latin America the state can be strong in
the capital city and weak elsewhere (O’Donnell 1993). Military units might operate
autonomously vis-à-vis the central government especially in remote areas facing
major security threats and known for little or no state presence. Ferreyra and Segura
(2000) find, for instance, that the armed forces in Colombia and Mexico have became
so deeply entrenched in local political and economic realities that local military action
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affected national regime type. The Ecuadorian and Peruvian cases suggest that a lack
of government supervision of local military behavior has created an escape valve
from the opposing pressures on the armed forces that neoliberal reform and democ-
ratization have caused, such that control of military finances has merely pushed
military–client interactions to the local level.
Case Selection and Data Sources
The Ecuador–Peru pairing provides similarities and differences valuable for a
comparative analysis of third-party financing of Latin American armed forces.
First, consistent with regional trends, the two countries have experienced
democratic transition and economic opening. Ecuador’s transition from military
rule occurred in 1979, though, as discussed below, major government efforts to
achieve civilian control were ongoing over two decades later. The Peruvian
military left power in 1980, and the post-2000 period has also been treated as a
period of democratization with the conclusion of the elected but corrupt,
repressive, and militarized government of Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000).2 In
both countries, the 1990s were the most intense period of liberal economic reform,
including in the extractive industries.3
Second, in contrast to military institutions occupied mainly by on-base training,
the Ecuadorian and Peruvian armies actively perform security work, making army
interactions with clients more likely. Third, because much of the armies’ overall
activities take place in specific regions—northern Ecuador and insurgent zones in
Peru’s southern highlands—the cases permit close-up analysis of local army–client
agreements while also making it possible to arrive at conclusions about the larger
armies.
Fourth and finally, the armies’ varied missions allow us to assess the influence of
paying third parties in different ways. The Ecuadorian army performs various polic-
ing assignments, for example, crime fighting and control of popular unrest, in
Ecuador’s north. Clients there should thus compete for different army services,
helping us identify which clients wield more power than others. In contrast, the
Peruvian army’s single mission in guerrilla zones is counterinsurgency.4 Because
Latin American militaries widely view combat against armed insurgents as a highly
professional mission (e.g., Stepan 1973; Perelli and Rial 1996, p. 72), it is expected
that third parties would find it difficult to hire an army to orient its counterinsurgency
2 On the Fujimori government’s authoritarian practices, see Rospigliosi (2000) and Carrión (2007).
3 Peru’s decisive turn toward a liberal economic model is well-known among experts on political economy
in Latin America (e.g., Stokes 2001; Weyland 2002). Guasti (1983, pp. 187–192), Kay (1996), and Bury
(2005) analyze private-sector involvement in Peru’s extractive industries across time. Ecuador’s most
radical reforms were enacted under President Sixto Durán Ballén (1992–1996). Hey and Klak (1999)
analyze the uneven nature of neoliberal reform in Ecuador from the 1980s through the 1990s. On the
trajectory of private involvement in Ecuador’s oil sector since oil was discovered in 1967, see Conaghan
(1988, p. 85), Sawyer (2004, pp. 94–97), and Benton (2008).
4 The author has analyzed the two armies’ varied performance of police missions elsewhere (Jaskoski
2008).
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services around their specific needs, making the Peruvian case a hard test of client
influence.5
This article is based mainly on data collected during 2005 and 2006. The author
conducted semistructured interviews with officers and civilians in multiple locations
in the two countries. The sample of army officers consisted of 152 officers of all
ranks. Ecuadorian army officers were interviewed in the capital city of Quito and on
seven army bases from all four of the army’s regional commands. In Peru, most army
officers interviewed in the capital city of Lima were instructors and students from the
army war college and from seven different service (e.g., cavalry, communications,
infantry) schools. Interviews were also conducted on a key army base in a Peruvian
insurgency zone. Outside of the two armies, the author interviewed over 170 journal-
ists; academics; representatives of nongovernmental organizations; private-sector
actors; navy, air force, and police officers; elected and appointed local and regional
political officials; and officials from the US defense and state departments. Interview
data were supplemented with information collected from newspaper and government
archives, army doctrinal materials, and secondary sources. Follow-up research was
carried out in the two countries in early 2009.
Assessments of army behavior are based on interviews with officers who had
served in the units analyzed, as well as non-army actors familiar with the local
settings. Where possible, the article triangulates across subjects, subject groups, and
data sources. In order to protect the privacy of study subjects, this article does not
identify them by name or interview date or location. (Mention of a specific army unit
does not imply that the author visited it. During interviews, officers spoke of their
current and prior assignments.)
Local Third-Party Financing of the Ecuadorian and Peruvian Armies
Local army commanders in the areas of Ecuador and Peru in which the armies are
most active have decided when and where to provide security in response to resource
transfers from clients, especially private hydrocarbon and mining companies. As
summarized in Table 1, clients generally have reimbursed army units with in-kind
payments, ensuring that army work has benefited them directly, thereby diverting the
units from serving the public.
Ecuador: Policing for Hire
Since Ecuador’s transition to democracy, northern Ecuador has faced two main kinds
of insecurity. First, popular unrest over oil policies (e.g., Gerlach 2003; Sawyer 2004)
5 As proof of the strong commitment of the Peruvian military in particular to counterinsurgency, in the
1980s and 1990s the military (primarily the army) was responsible for approximately 32 % of the nearly
70,000 deaths and disappearances resulting from Peru’s internal conflict (Comisión de la Verdad y
Reconciliación 2003, Compendio estadístico, 86). Of the 50 Peruvian army officers interviewed for this
study who were asked to identify the most important activities of Peru’s army, 34 mentioned counterin-
surgency and/or external defense in their first three responses: 12 mentioned counterinsurgency, 12 others
mentioned external defense, and 10 mentioned both.
176 St Comp Int Dev (2013) 48:172–195
manifests itself in protests, mainly in the oil-rich northeast. Second, Colombian
insurgents, primarily the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, have used
northern Ecuador to rest, resupply, and train for their fight against the Colombian
state security forces and paramilitaries back home. The guerrillas do not carry out
military attacks in Ecuador. Nonetheless, they have brought to the north
insecurity—for example, contributing to the illegal drug trade, weapons trafficking,
and kidnappings—which rose with the 2000 implementation of the Colombia–US Plan
Colombia, a major military offensive against insurgents.6 The Ecuadorian army reacted
to this insecurity by sending more personnel to the north for the purpose of patrolling
the border and fighting drug trafficking and general crime.7
Analysis of the behavior of all Ecuadorian army battalions stationed in the
three northern border provinces (Sucumbíos, Carchi, and Esmeraldas), as well
as the work of other key army units with security responsibilities in the north,
reveals that local clients have helped to determine which missions Ecuadorian
army brigade and battalion commanders in the north have performed. For
instance, one local client has been US military personnel. To encourage the
Ecuadorian army to perform antinarcotics and defend the northern border,
shortly after the start of Plan Colombia, the US military began supplementing
its relations with Ecuadorian military leadership in Quito with local, northern
efforts. Ecuadorian army commanders in the north have ordered antinarcotics
operations in response to urging by US military personnel and regularly have
sought more material support from them. Army patrols have also provided
security for wealthy landowners facing threats of crop and livestock theft,
extortion, and kidnapping. (Those patrols have not been “public,” as they have
6 Andrade (2002), Montúfar (2003), and International Crisis Group (2004) also examine insecurity in
northern Ecuador due to Plan Colombia.
7 In 2001, the command center of the army’s division responsible for army security in the northeast moved
north to the city of Francisco de Orellana, in the northeastern province of Orellana. The army had added
7,000 personnel to the north as of September 2003 (El Comercio [Quito] 2003).
Table 1 Local army–client deals in Peru and Ecuador
Case Mission Client Payment




Antinarcotics US military Communications equipment,
patrol supplies, vehicles
Rural security Wealthy landowners;
provincial prefects
Food, fuel, lodging, tires
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not provided security for the impoverished people who live within the same
cantons as the paying, wealthy landowners.) Mayors and prefects have used
local and provincial state resources, respectively, to pay local army units for
anticrime patrols.
Oil companies have been the Ecuadorian army’s most influential client in the
north. Army commanders have negotiated with companies the terms by which their
units provide security for wells, refineries, and pipelines in the face of popular protest
and possible sabotage by protesters. More than 2,000 army personnel in the army’s
fourth division, which is tasked with providing security in the northeast, have
concentrated continuously on oil security (El Comercio [Quito] 2007).8 Within that
division, the 19th brigade stands out for its oil work. The brigade is based in the
province of Orellana, just south of Sucumbíos. All of the brigade’s battalions have
provided oil companies security, which fully occupies one of the brigade’s remaining
five combat forces and, at times, the other four combat units. In the province of
Sucumbíos, which borders the war-torn Colombian department of Putumayo and thus
is the province most affected by Colombia’s conflict, oil takes priority. All battalions
in the province (some belonging to the 19th brigade) have protected oil interests, and
one of those units, in Shushufindi, has focused mainly on the mission. Adding to
work by army personnel permanently stationed in the north, special forces units
housed farther south in the highland city of Latacunga have set aside other assign-
ments in order to rush to manage oil protests in the northeast. Importantly, private oil
companies have influenced the army; where the state oil company Petroecuador
remains active, local army units have tended to negotiate with Petroecuador’s private
contractors.9
Oil companies have been sufficiently influential to win out over other clients in
competition for army services. For example, during protests in Dayuma, Orellana, in
late 2007, US military representatives gave supplies to a local school. Their goal was
to help satisfy local needs in order to quell the protests and thus free up the
Ecuadorian army to turn to US priorities, antinarcotics and border defense efforts
farther north. Oil companies’ power is also greater than landowners’ influence. The
Esmeraldas unit provides considerable security for the private oil pipeline (of OCP
Ecuador S.A.) but has done relatively little to protect landowners. In contrast, security
deals with landowners have been vital to the battalion in Carchi, a province that lacks
oil and associated infrastructure.
Peru: Counterinsurgency for Hire
Different from the Ecuadorian case, Peru’s army has sold its security services to
clients that demand protection against an internal guerrilla movement. In the 1980s
and 1990s, Peru saw a major period of violent insurrection from the Maoist Shining
8 This number represents a relatively large proportion of one division, as the four-division army is made up
of approximately 34,000 personnel, according to a journalist with extensive experience reporting on
Ecuador’s military.
9 Not all of the army’s oil work has been arranged locally. During major protests, the national government
has declared a state of emergency, bringing more military force to the northeast. Furthermore, for a period,
military leaders contracted with oil companies (see below), though those national contracts left much to be
negotiated at the local level.
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Path (Sendero Luminoso). State security forces eliminated much of the armed threat
by the mid-1990s, although Sendero has continued sporadically engaging in kidnap-
ping and ambushing national military and police patrols in the Upper Huallaga Valley
zone in the central highlands and, in the southern highlands, in the Valley of the
Apurímac and Ene Rivers (VRAE), where the army most actively performs security
operations.
Local representatives from private companies in the critical hydrocarbon and
mining sectors have reimbursed Peruvian army personnel for their counterinsurgency
services in the VRAE. In the 1980s and 1990s, army units were assigned to all of
Peru’s main mines.10 Local contracts have diverted patrols to protect private company
infrastructure. For instance, in the Huanta province of the southern highland depart-
ment of Ayacucho, one of the counterinsurgency bases belonging to the local army
battalion provided regular patrols in and around a community named Ocros for a
period during the late 1990s. When an official working for a nearby private mining
company asked the battalion commander to protect the company infrastructure, all
patrols leaving from the counterinsurgency base began patrolling the company’s
installations and mine, and not Ocros. Days after the mining official requested the
security, the battalion began receiving gifts, including several televisions.
An example of more recent client influence on Peru’s army is the case of
the private natural gas conglomerate Camisea. The Camisea pipeline crosses
the VRAE on its way to the coast, and as of 2005, the army had small units
near each of Camisea’s 14 installations along the pipeline. The brigade in
Ayacucho assigned all of its counterinsurgency bases—numbering over ten—to
pipeline security, work also performed by bases in the department of Cusco.
Camisea security has represented a sizeable proportion of the army’s total
efforts in the VRAE, considering that counterinsurgency bases there in recent
years have numbered between 27 and 35.11 Services for Camisea have side-
tracked the Ayacucho brigade from what otherwise might have been more
effective counterinsurgency operations. Army patrols from Camisea infrastruc-
ture have been daytime patrols that have not ventured into common Sendero
training or operational spaces. In contrast, some patrols leaving from the
brigade’s larger battalion bases spent a night at a time away from the base,
thus covering more remote areas, including possibly terrain frequented by
Sendero. The Camisea security has resulted from contracting between local
army commanders and Camisea representatives. For example, the head of the
Ayacucho brigade has negotiated with Transportadora de Gas del Perú (TGP),
the Camisea consortium that operates the pipeline. TGP constructed and stocked
the brigade’s pipeline bases and funded their patrols.12
10 A senior officer estimated that in the departments of Junín and Huancavelica alone, there were
approximately 30 or 35 such units.
11 This estimate is based on interviews with army officers and private-sector officials in 2005 and 2006 and
on research conducted by Peruvian security expert Ricardo Soberón Garrido (2006).
12 Although in Peru most army–company contracting has occurred locally, military leaders have partici-
pated in cases in which major army equipment is involved, most notably, army helicopter rentals.
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Private Versus State Security Interests
Because this analysis emphasizes the influence of private companies in extractive
industries, it is essential to acknowledge the overlap between those private client
interests, on one hand, and (public) national security interests in each country, on the
other. Security for the important hydrocarbon and, in Peru, mining sectors is in the
interest of national security according to political and military leaders. Yet that
overlap cannot account for the extent to which local army units have responded to
payments from mining and hydrocarbon companies. In neither country have the
government or army leadership put security for the extractive industries first, gener-
ally speaking or in the specific regions of focus.
Ecuador’s 1979 National Security Law (in effect at the time research for this
study was conducted) assigns the military to protect oil and other “strategic”
interests. More recently, a June 2007 decree defined oil installations as “strate-
gic objectives vital to the nation” and committed the military to provide
security for “all installations, equipment, and components of the national hy-
drocarbon system” (El Comercio [Quito] 2007). However, government and military
leaders have not regarded oil security as the army’s main priority. In fact, a 2001
directive from the commander of the army’s fourth division states that the division
would provide security to oil companies “without neglecting its fundamental mis-
sions and assignments” (Jarrín Roman 2001, section D). As for the Ecuadorian army
officers interviewed for this study, of the 46 officers asked to name the army’s most
important missions, in their first three responses, 33 officers mentioned border
defense and/or reducing Colombian insurgent activities in Ecuador, and only 4
mentioned oil security.
Similar to the Ecuadorian case, Peru’s army has been assigned to protect mining
and hydrocarbon interests. During interviews, military leaders and civilian security
experts sought to justify this work by referencing the constitutional mandate that the
military “participate in the country’s social and economic development” (1979
Peruvian Const. art. 280; 1993 Peruvian Const. art. 171). In a 2000 agreement
between Camisea and the Peruvian government, the armed forces (and national
police) were to provide “the necessary security measures” when possible (Comité
Especial del Proyecto Camisea, Comisión de Promoción de la Inversión Privada
[COPRI], República del Perú 2000, clause 17.4). Nonetheless, security for the
extractive industries has not been characterized as the army’s primary mission overall
or in Sendero zones, where, according to military and nonmilitary security experts
interviewed, the army’s central mission instead has been counterinsurgency. Of the 50
Peruvian army officers asked to name the army’s most important missions, no officer
mentioned security for natural resources or resource extraction.
The Local Level as Escape Valve
Though without testing rigorously this paper’s framework, the analysis to come does
illustrate how the proposed causal story may be at work in Ecuador and Peru:
neoliberal reform, democratization, and weak state capacity to oversee military affairs
together seem to have encouraged local army self-financing.
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Step 1: Expanded Private Client Base and Dwindling Funds
If it is true that neoliberal reforms add to the military’s possible client list by
privatizing state-owned enterprises, then prior to reforms in Ecuador and Peru,
presumably, the army would have supplied security for the (few) private oil and
mining companies that were active in exchange for resources. Examples presented
here reveal exactly that dynamic.
Before Ecuador’s government promoted private investment in the oil sector in the
1990s, the army worked for private oil companies, which financed those army
services. A retired army helicopter pilot recounted in an interview the work he had
done for oil companies beginning in the mid-1980s. He and other pilots had helped
make seismic evaluations from the air—in the northeast and on the coast. The officer
also had transported exploration materials to mining company encampments. Con-
tracts for those projects were signed by the companies and either the army aviation
commander or the head of the army.
Similarly, the Peruvian army conducted security operations paid for by the private
mining sector before privatization. The US Southern Peru Copper Corporation,
unique for surviving Peru’s nationalization of mining in the 1970s,13 was the only
company that Peruvian officers named when describing the army’s mining security
work in the 1980s. For example, an officer said the following about army security
contracts in the 1980s and 1990s:
During the worst conflicts with Sendero, we had much of the country under a
state of emergency. If a mining company was in an emergency zone, then the
military was responsible for protecting it…So for Southern, a small army unit
was sent to provide security for the copper company.
What did the army unit get in return for this work?
It got housing, food, transportation, to carry out this work, from the company.
Moving from client demand to the issue of whether, by reducing the army’s
budget, neoliberalism and/or democratization have encouraged the army to pursue
private clients, the scenario becomes more complicated. Neoliberal economic reforms
as well as democratization have diminished each army’s resource base, making self-
financing even more attractive. However, resource cuts mainly have affected not the
national budget but rather off-budget revenue due to heightened scrutiny of military
finances.
As predicted by scholars of civil–military relations who expect that, in young
democracies, governments cut defense spending and instead invest in more popular
programs (Hunter 1997), defense spending has decreased as a proportion of the
national budget in both countries.14 Yet trends in actual defense budgets challenge
13 On the history of Southern’s investment in Peru, see Kuramoto (1999).
14 In Peru, this figure fell from 14.4 % in 1989 to 8 % in 2006. In Ecuador, the defense budget went from
10.9 to 7.3 % of national spending between 1995 and 2006, though security experts interviewed over-
whelmingly attributed the drop to the conclusion of the longstanding Peru–Ecuador border conflict rather
than to economic reforms or democratization. Budget information in this section is drawn from Palomino
Milla (2004, p. 131), Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, Perú (2006), and Ministerio de Economía y
Finanzas, Ecuador (2007).
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the idea that, under neoliberalism, military budgets are slashed. After the 1998
Peru–Ecuador peace agreement (an event distinct from both democratization and
neoliberal reform), in 1999 Ecuador’s defense budget contracted by 33 %, but
military spending recovered such that in 2002 it was 26 % larger than it had
been in 1998. The Peruvian military budget, too, has been steady and growing
since the end of the 1990s. It fell in 2002, when it was 14 and 20 % smaller
than in 2000 and 2001, respectively, and yet by 2004, national defense spend-
ing had surpassed the 2000 budget, and in 2005, it was higher than it had been
in 2001.15
Though the national defense budgets have not shrunk, in each country, the army’s
off-budget revenue has been reduced due to democratization and neoliberalism. In
Ecuador, both developments have interfered with military business ventures, which
have included, for instance, the army’s investments in the shrimp, flower, textile, and
hotel industries (Fitch 1998, p. 122). One key democratizing moment in Ecuador was
the 1998 constitutional assembly to replace the former military regime’s 1978
constitution (amended in 1996). During the deliberations, politicians unsuccessfully
sought to lessen the military’s presence in the national economy in nondefense
sectors, which at the time was quite important for the armed forces: as of 1998,
military companies’ revenue constituted approximately 40 % of the military budget
(El Comercio [Quito] 1998b). If democratization created space to examine Ecuador-
ian military finances, the country’s turn toward a liberal economic model also proved
crucial. Based on newspaper reports, the debate over military involvement in nonde-
fense sectors centered mainly on the question of whether or not the armed forces
should compete with the private sector (e.g., El Comercio [Quito] 1998a).
The logic of democratization again directly challenged the Ecuadorian mili-
tary’s alternative sources of income several years later. During a period in
which the executive was taking various measures to augment civilian control
of the armed forces, a 2007 defense law and the executive-initiated 2008
constitution outlawed military participation in any private industries not related
to national defense. The military was subsequently stripped of many of its
investments (Fundación Democracia, Seguridad y Defensa 2007; Observatorio
Político de Defensa, Seguridad y Relaciones Civil-Militares 2007–2008; Latin Amer-
ican Herald Tribune 2009).
In Peru, democratization brought with it civilian control of military finances and
thus an end to major illegal revenue sources that previously had been possible. A
congressional commission created to investigate economic and financial crimes
between 1990 and 2001 found that the military had been involved in various financial
criminal activities. For instance, Fujimori had used supreme decrees and secret
“urgency decrees” to channel monies from government privatization contracts and
the external debt to the defense sector. The majority of the urgency decrees were not
15 Currencies were converted to US dollars to calculate defense spending. The Ecuadorian and Peruvian
cases illustrate a more general dynamic in Latin America, where defense spending has lost importance
relative to other sectors but without contracting. On average, South American defense spending as a
percentage of GDP dropped from 2.17 to 1.89 % but rose by 49 % in real terms between 1989 and 2007
(Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). For Peru and Venezuela, these calculations use 1991,
the first year for which the source provides data, in place of 1989.
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approved by the Council of Ministers as constitutionally mandated (Hernández Breña
2003, pp. 85–86).16
Step 2: Local Entrepreneurship to Escape Oversight in the Capital
At the same time that neoliberal reforms and democratization appear to have expand-
ed the private client base of the Ecuadorian and Peruvian armies and encouraged the
armies to work for those clients to make up for lost revenues, the government
oversight of military financial activities that has come with neoliberalism and de-
mocracy has introduced barriers to army dealings with third parties.
The IMF has scrutinized Ecuadorian state, including military, financial practices. For
example, according to an Ecuadorian finance ministry official, because of IMF guide-
lines, in 2001, Ecuador’s government began deriving the national budget from debt and
contracts to avoid underestimating government spending. (Prior to that point the budget
had been based only on actual purchases.) Regarding the military budget in particular, a
retired senior finance ministry official said that the government produced two statistics
specifically for the IMF regarding public finances and that one statistic included the
National Defense Junta (JDN), which purchased and maintained military equipment.
Previously, JDN’s budget and expenditures had been less transparent.17 Turning from
the influence of neoliberal reform to that of democratization, amid executive efforts to
decrease military autonomy, the 2007 defense law (discussed above) outlawed
resource exchanges between the military and the private sector.18
The Peruvian government also improved state transparency, as part of the post-
Fujimori democratic transition. For example, Congress passed the 2002 Law of
Transparency and Access to Public Information. That same year, a national oversight
system was created, assigning every government sector—including the defense
ministry and each military branch—an institutional control office that reports to the
national audit office (Robles Montoya 2005, pp. 139–140). Military budget informa-
tion is now available to the public in a format comparable to other ministerial budgets
for purposes of congressional analysis (Hernández Breña 2003, p. 34). Of particular
interest here, greater transparency has also been introduced into military–private
sector exchanges. The Peruvian armed forces are permitted legally to rent out their
equipment, infrastructure, and services to other state, as well as private, actors in
return for “resources directly collected” (recursos directamente recaudados [RDR]),
16 Another funding source under Fujimori that no longer fuels the army is drug money, though this shift is
not explained by democratization or liberal economic reforms. After the army began drug interdiction in the
1990s, corruption from the cocaine trade consolidated throughout the hierarchy (Dreyfus 1999, pp. 388–
389; Rospigliosi 2000, p. 219). Military corruption was reinforced by practices of Peru’s intelligence forces
under Fujimori’s reign: Fujimori’s intelligence advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos, and the national intelligence
service were heavily involved in the cocaine trade (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación 2003; Tomo II, pp.
242–243; Rojas 2005, pp. 208–209). When corruption contributed to the army’s poor performance in the
1995 Peru–Ecuador Cenepa War, the army withdrew from antinarcotics (Rospigliosi 2000, pp. 163–164).
17 Prior to that point, a budget law in the early 1990s had increased the transparency of spending practices
of certain public entities, including the JDN, according to an Ecuadorian Central Bank official.
18 Demand to end military–private sector contracting emerged strongly in 2005, immediately after the
national press reported on a 2001 5-year contract between the armed forces and 16 private oil companies
(Ministerio de Defensa Nacional del Ecuador 2001; Hoy [Quito] 2001; El Comercio [Quito] 2005a, b). The
focus of debate over the contract was the extent to which the military’s oil services were in the interests of
“national patrimony” as opposed to serving the private sector (El Comercio [Quito] 2005a, b).
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which are reported as part of the defense budget.19 The military has more diligently
reported this income since Fujimori left office because of the government’s emphasis
on state accountability, as explained by army officers interviewed.
How have the armies dealt with this reality, in which transitions to democracy and
the liberal economic model have encouraged them to contract with third-party clients
while also interfering with that endeavor? Increasingly, the armies seem to engage in
entrepreneurship at the local level, unchecked by civilians. Research for this study
uncovered no indication that local commanders underwent civilian auditing. Ecua-
dor’s 2007 law that outlaws army–private sector contracts did halt national-level
deals. However, local agreements between army unit commanders and private oil
companies continued as of early 2009, according to a journalist knowledgeable about
the army and its operations in the north. In Peru, in addition to RDR, army brigades
and battalions have also earned unreported income, which has committed local units
to providing their clients services.
The strongest evidence that local client influence could be growing in the two
countries is that army leaders have pressed unit commanders to raise more revenue
through entrepreneurship.20 For instance, an Ecuadorian army officer familiar with
the finances of the army’s special forces’ brigade in Latacunga said in an interview
that, not counting salaries and food, the army provided only approximately 20 % of
the unit’s operating expenses and that the colonel in charge of the brigade had to find
a way to pay for the work that army leaders expected of the brigade.
The Nueva Loja battalion, believed to be the army’s most active unit in Sucumbíos
and the north, received only $200 from the army each year to maintain its 30 vehicles.
An officer who had managed finances for that unit emphasized the high-stress nature
of the job, explaining that the battalion was continually late on vender payments.
Beyond the north, the army provided the brigade in the southern coastal city of
Machala approximately one tenth of its diesel and one sixth of its gasoline. Ecua-
dorian army units have been sufficiently desperate to rely on their microenterprises as
well as their security contracts. The Nueva Loja battalion earned $6,000–7,000 each
year from its fish and chicken farms to put toward fuel purchases. The Latacunga
brigade covered nearly 20 % of its operating expenses (omitting salaries and food)
with earnings from its dairy and other farm products. Based on his experience as the
finance officer for over ten units throughout Ecuador, one officer said that, since the
mid-1990s, army leaders had placed more demands on local commanders to obtain
outside support.
Peruvian army leaders also have pushed local commanders to raise funds. As one
army officer said, “The army has its priorities, which include rations for the troops,
ammunition, and fuel. But what is not prioritized by the army is electricity, water…
paper for the office…So the units have to come up with this, to make up the
difference.”
19 From 2003 through 2005, between approximately 8 and 11 % of the annual national defense budget
came from RDR (Robles Montoya 2003, pp. 159–161; 2005, p. 145). The armed forces earned over one
half of those resources by charging for services, including air and sea transportation and medical assistance
(Palomino Milla 2004, pp. 144–145).
20 The following discussion of army unit finances is based on information provided by local army
commanders and other officers with direct knowledge about the referenced units’ finances, gained through
their work on those bases.
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To help make ends meet, army unit commanders have rented out their base
infrastructure, and throughout the country—e.g., the southern departments of
Puno and Tacna, the northern department of Tumbes, and the eastern city of
Iquitos—units have sold goods from their plantations to surrounding communi-
ties. Engineering battalions have contracted out their construction services,
reporting only some of the income to army leaders in Lima in the form of
RDR, as explained by a retired officer from the army corps of engineers: “[W]e
need resources to fix the equipment, for maintenance…So the units might work
for twelve hours, rent the equipment and men out for that period of time, but
then report to Lima that they worked for only three hours.” The proportion of
base operating expenses covered by these various activities has ranged from
15–20 % in Tumbes to 20–30 % for one base in the southern department of
Arequipa to 50 % in Tacna.
Paralleling the Ecuadorian case, pressures on Peruvian army commanders to self-
finance have intensified, as a midranking officer described, referencing his own past
assignments:
…Based on this information, the next year’s budget is calculated. For instance, I
tell the general that we raised 80,000 soles last year, and I say that to run the
[unit] I need 300,000 soles for…this year. He gives me 200,000 and tells me to
work harder this year to come up with the extra 100,000 soles.
Indonesia and Nigeria: Demand-Induced Local Entrepreneurship
The Indonesian and Nigerian cases prove rich for applying this study’s frame-
work to countries beyond Latin America. Economically, the two countries have
opened substantially in recent years, and they have a long history of heavy
military involvement in politics, followed by democratization in 1999.21 Fur-
thermore, the countries’ economies rely heavily on extractive industries, and private
companies in those sectors have reimbursed the military for security services.
Relative to Ecuador and Peru, Indonesia and Nigeria provide variation in
government supervision of military resources. As studies of democratization and
neoliberalism predict, governments in the two countries have sought to control
military financial practices, and yet negligible progress on that front has meant
that neither military has resorted to local security contracting to avoid scrutiny
in the capital. Nonetheless, the Indonesian and Nigerian armed forces still have
turned their attention toward local security markets, by a different logic. Strong
demand-side forces, due partly to deep fiscal decentralization, have pulled the
military to the local level.
21 Nigeria’s 1999 elections heralded in democracy—or at least “a pluralistic and largely credible set of
outcomes” (Diamond 2008, p. 71). Despite subsequent irregularities ranging from stuffing ballot boxes to
politically targeted assassinations (Diamond 2008, p. 71) that have pushed the regime outside the demo-
cratic category, this analysis assumes that the country has opened politically enough such that we would
expect some degree of government oversight of the armed forces and their financial practices.
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Indonesia
The Indonesian armed forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia [TNI]) engage in
extensive self-financing, which was institutionalized starting in the 1950s
when military units were required to establish their own businesses and
cooperatives to support their operations (Mietzner 2008, pp. 227–229). Under
the military-backed Suharto dictatorship (1967–1998), the president’s foundations,
along with companies belonging to his cronies, served as added, steady revenue
streams for the TNI. Regional military commanders were also compensated by
companies for helping to obtain business licenses, resolve land disputes, navigate
bureaucratic processes, and control labor unrest (Mietzner 2008, pp. 229–230;
Crouch 2010, pp. 164–165).
In terms of the TNI’s work for extractive industries, to illustrate this type of
“informal” entrepreneurial work, the US company Freeport-McMoRan Copper &
Gold’s mine in Papua is more militarized than any other zone in Indonesia (Leith
2003, p. 233). The company has paid TNI personnel throughout the hierarchy in the
form of varied material support (New York Times 2005; Rieffel and Pramodhawardani
2007, pp. 43–44; Mietzner 2008, p. 231; Crouch 2010, pp. 165–166). Another
example is ExxonMobil’s natural gas project, which has operated in Aceh province
since the 1970s. On an ongoing basis, the company has reimbursed the TNI for security
there (Rieffel and Pramodhawardani 2007, p. 44). In both the Freeport and ExxonMo-
bil cases, the military pitched its security services to the companies by emphasizing
dangers posed by armed separatist movements in Aceh and Papua (Crouch 2010, p.
166).
Since 1999, the TNI has continued its self-financing practices, which account for
between 30 and 60 % of defense spending (Mietzner 2008, p. 236; Crouch 2010, p
162). Local military entrepreneurship is so rampant that military commanders in the
capital of Jakarta and even regional commanders have had difficulty controlling their
subordinates (Crouch 2010, p. 169). During this period, subnational governments
have become important clients of the armed forces (Crouch 2010, p. 165), and the
military has expanded its informal entrepreneurial activities, especially security for
private actors (Mietzner 2008, pp. 230–231).
Neoliberal reform and democratization have created added incentives for
the TNI to sell security to clients, by enhancing the power of the private
sector and diminishing the military’s revenue. Private-sector expansion under
neoliberalism is noteworthy. As of the late 1990s, the private sector was
already powerful in mining—which was privately controlled (Wicaksono
2008, p. 153)—and hydrocarbons. Further economic opening produced more poten-
tial clients for the armed forces: a 2001 oil and gas law privatized upstream and
downstream activities, stimulating major new private investment in hydrocarbons
(Steele 2008, p. 94).
As for any threats to the TNI’s funds that encourage it to look for third-
party clients, as in Ecuador and Peru, challenges to off-budget military
revenue are salient, whereas national defense budget cuts are not. Indonesian
defense spending has risen in real terms and has remained steady as a
percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) (Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute; Crouch 2010, p. 162), in spite of the fact that democratization
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did unleash popular support to reduce the military budget (Rieffel and Pramodha-
wardani 2007, p. 2).22
The process toward military financial reform, which ultimately affected the TNI’s
off-budget revenue, began in 2000, when IMF and World Bank pressures led
Indonesia’s national audit board to investigate military institutions, an audit that
was reported back to the national parliament (Crouch 2010, p. 168).23 Members of
parliament from several parties prioritized the military financing issue (Mietzner
2008, p. 233), and following a parliamentary review of TNI’s financing, the govern-
ment relieved the TNI of its companies between 2004 and 2009 (Mietzner 2008, p.
233; Crouch 2010, p. 168).24 The military’s bigger financial loss was that democra-
tization eliminated its monopoly of political patronage.25 “With TNI no longer the
decisive force in Indonesian politics, patronage-seeking investors increasingly turned
to new actors in the post-authoritarian polity: political parties, parliamentarians,
bureaucrats and influential socio-religious leaders” (Mietzner 2008, p. 230).
Government monitoring does not extend to the TNI’s illegal revenue, as the state
has not found the means to finance security for the critical mining and oil sectors or
for major manufacturing and infrastructure projects (Rieffel and Pramodhawardani
2007, pp. 68–69; Mietzner 2008, pp. 231, 235–236). Therefore, the military has not
used the local level to escape government control in the capital. Nonetheless, demand
from subnational political actors pulls TNI entrepreneurship to the local level.
Indonesia’s fiscal decentralization came with democratization: the same individuals
who developed the legal framework for democratic elections in 1999 also drafted two
major decentralization laws that were passed the same year.Within that structure, the share
of government spending on regions rose from approximately 15 to 30 %, and regions
gained significant discretion over spending (Malley 2009, pp. 140–141). Regional and
district governments’ newfound wealth has made them an attractive target for entre-
preneurial officers commanding local military units (Crouch 2010, p. 165).
Nigeria
Similar to the Indonesian case, client demand for Nigerian military services is
powerful at the local level, especially in the oil-rich Niger Delta region. Conflict in
the Delta escalated from peaceful protest in the 1980s to violent ethnic conflict and oil
protests beginning in the 1990s. This change has been attributed to oil companies’
detrimental environmental practices; successive military governments’ centralized
control of oil rents, which they did not invest back into the poor, underdeveloped
22 Simultaneously, there has also been a drive toward boosting defense spending, to lessen TNI’s reliance
on third-party resources (Crouch 2010, p. 162).
23 In a context in which Indonesian law did not allow the audit board to investigate private companies
controlled by public agencies, the Indonesian army assigned Price Waterhouse Coopers and Ernst & Young
that task (Crouch 2010, p. 168).
24 It took several years for parliament to act because, immediately following the transition to democracy,
financing the TNI without its independently acquired, off-budget resources was almost unthinkable,
especially in the aftermath of major economic crisis during 1997 and 1998 (Mietzner 2008, p. 233).
25 Economic crisis in 1997 and 1998 and the TNI’s poor management of its enterprises meant that, by the
time the military lost its businesses, they were of minor economic value (Mietzner 2008, pp. 230, 235–236;
Crouch 2010, pp. 162–164). In addition, whereas the TNI no longer has its companies, it has successfully
fought to retain its foundations and cooperatives (Mietzner 2008, pp. 234–235).
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Delta; and ethnic conflict deepened both by the unequal distribution of resources that
did reach the region and by selective government repression (Frynas 2001, pp. 29–36;
Ukeje 2001, pp. 15–16, 20). In a context in which 80 % of Nigerian government
revenue comes from oil (Ukeje 2001, p. 19), oil companies and the state have
responded to conflict in the Delta by investing in security.26
Beyond national oil policy, the Nigerian armed forces maintain their own strong
interest in oil, which funds them in the forms of central government defense spend-
ing, private companies’ payments to the military for security, and revenue from the
illegal theft and export of oil. Examples of relations between oil companies and the
military are numerous. Nigerian army representatives have assisted with Shell’s
public relations strategies in at least one international setting (Frynas 2001, p. 45).
Shell Nigeria created the military–police Rivers State Internal Security Task Force in
1994, and the military administrator of Rivers State served as the contact point
between the head of the Task Force and Shell (Frynas 2001, pp. 49–50). Shell
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria has paid Nigerian military units, and
Chevron Nigeria Limited and Shell have provided transportation for soldiers leading
up to and during military operations (Pegg 1999, pp. 475–478).
The private sector has played a long-standing role in Nigerian oil production.27 Recent
economic opening has brought more, diverse investment to the oil sector, potentially
creating added opportunities for the military to work for private clients. Amid pressure
from international financial institutions, President Obasanjo’s government (1999–2007)
privatized oil marketing companies and brought new investment into upstream and
downstream activities (Ariyo and Jerome 2004, pp. 336–338; Obi 2007, pp. 19–21).
Neoliberalism and democratization in Nigeria have triggered efforts to gain civilian
control of military finances, though with highly limited results. Like in Indonesia, the
Nigerian national defense budget has not faced cuts. Democratization set loose some
popular demand within Nigeria to trim the military budget (Fayemi and Olonisakin
2008, p. 254). However, since 1999, defense spending has grown in real terms and
has followed only a rough downward trajectory as a percentage of GDP (Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute).
Moving to the military’s off-budget income, oversight of military finances in Nigeria
has been weak even relative to the Indonesian case. The overwhelming task of tracking
Nigerian oil revenue has made it unlikely that either the military’s current off-budget
earnings or possible future deals with oil companies would face government constraints.
As part of Nigeria’s second wave of liberal economic reforms—the first wave being
structural adjustment policies in the 1980s (Lewis 1996)—the government adopted
policies to introduce transparency into the notoriously corrupt oil sector,28 yet with modest
success (Omeje 2006, p. 29; Okpanachi 2011, pp. 37–39). Further complicating the
situation is oil theft. In the 1980s and 1990s, hundreds of millions of dollars were lost
26 For analysis of the different dimensions of company and state responses to conflict in the Delta,
including repressive security measures, see Frynas (2001).
27 Shell d’Arcy discovered oil in the Niger Delta in the 1950s (Obi 2007, p. 16), and the consortium
between the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation and Shell produced approximately 50 % of Nigerian
crude oil as of 2001 (Ukeje 2001, p. 19).
28 Between 1960 and 1999, governments skimmed approximately $400 billion in oil revenues (Okpanachi
2011, p. 28), and in the early 1990s, oil revenues lost because of corruption totaled up to one tenth of
Nigerian GDP (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, p. 67).
188 St Comp Int Dev (2013) 48:172–195
through petroleum smuggling, an activity controlled mainly by senior military
officers (Lewis 1996, p. 90). More recently, it has been estimated that between 10
and 15 % of Nigeria’s total production is stolen daily, and the military has continued
profiting from illegal oil exports, even as the Nigerian navy has stepped up its work to
reduce the theft and despite government efforts to contain military corruption (Ikelegbe
2005, pp. 222–224; Eberlein 2006, p. 585; Fayemi and Olonisakin 2008, pp. 250, 261).
Due to the lack of government control of military resources, the Nigerian armed
forces have been unrestricted in their dealings with paying clients, who increasingly
have hired security through local arrangements. Subnational governments now have
considerable wealth, partly because of fiscal decentralization. Oil-producing states
received 26 % of federally collected revenues in 1999 and 44 % in 2003 (Okpanachi
2011, p. 34). Subnational political offices also receive support from international aid
organizations and illicit oil exports (Eberlein 2006, pp. 584–586). The empowerment
of subnational politicians has been so dramatic that in the words of one expert on
Nigeria, “governors and their political machines in the Niger Delta stand at the centre
of powerful politico-economic complexes” (Eberlein 2006, p. 584).
For their part, oil companies have also turned attention outside the capital. The
“petro-military alliance” of the 1970s–1990s ensured security for private international
oil companies operating in Nigeria via centralized military decisions. Democratiza-
tion removed that automatic military security guarantee while also enabling different
actors to sell their security services, thereby diversifying companies’ options in terms
of security providers (Eberlein 2006, pp 580–581). Facing escalating social conflict,
oil companies and subnational political officials have hired different armed actors to
provide security and influence political, including electoral, outcomes through on-
the-ground arrangements (Eberlein 2006, pp. 580–582, 586–588; Human Rights
Watch 2005, pp. 4–7). Military personnel look to be operating within this incentive
structure, in that soldiers are “now free to offer their services to anybody capable of
paying” (Eberlein 2006, p. 581).
Paths toward Third-Party Financing of Militaries in the Developing World
This examination of the Nigerian and Indonesian cases alongside the Ecuador–Peru
analysis reveals two paths toward local military–client relations where opening econo-
mies have increased the importance and diversity of private-sector actors—i.e., possible
clients for the armed forces. If the government only weakly monitors the military, client
demand may pull the armed forces toward local entrepreneurship. As we saw in
Indonesia and Nigeria, unchecked by the government, the military has responded to
demand from subnational political officials and, in Nigeria, by a private sector now
permitted to hire different security forces to confront escalating regional violence. In
contrast, if the government gains some traction in controlling military financial practices,
then weak state capacity to extend supervision beyond the capital can mean that military
entrepreneurship continues but is pushed to the local level, as in Ecuador and Peru.
Figure 1 depicts these two paths, in addition to two other possible outcomes:
minimal (or no) third-party influence on the armed forces in cases in which the
government has constrained military finances and has the capacity to monitor the
behavior of military units, and substantial third-party financing of the military where
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the government has not constrained military financing and fiscal decentralization has
not been noteworthy. In this final scenario, the degree to which military–client
relations takes place at the local as opposed to the national level could depend on
the location of client demand and centralization of military power—whereby more
centralization would hinder local entrepreneurship.
It is noteworthy that, in the two Latin American cases, only minute demand-side
pull complements the escape-valve mechanism. With the region’s recent move
toward political and fiscal decentralization—which is somewhat correlated with
two central factors of interest here, neoliberalism and democratization29—subnational
governments have the potential to exercise important demand. Indeed, we saw that
one client group of the Ecuadorian army has been subnational political officials.
However, fiscal decentralization, and therefore, such subnational demand for security,
has been weak in Ecuador and Peru.
In Ecuador, a 1997 law and the 1998 constitution required the transfer of 15 % of
the national budget to subnational governments (O’Neill 2003, p. 1072). That
structure was implemented fully by the end of 2003 (after army leaders had already
begun pressing local commanders to earn more through self-financing). Thereafter,
subnational government spending rose to approximately 22 % of total public expen-
ditures (Frank 2008, pp. 374–375). Subnational governments’ budgets have come
mainly in the form of transfers and thus have been unpredictable in terms of size and
timing, i.e., when over the course of the year funds arrive. Conditions also greatly
restrict spending options for the transferred revenues (Frank 2008, pp. 374, 378–380).
Trivial amounts of Ecuadorian oil royalties are distributed to subnational govern-
ments (Energy Sector Management Assistance Program 2005, chap. 4).
Decentralization in Peru has taken place since Fujimori’s departure from office. In
2003, regional and local governments received 29 % of the national budget, and in
2006, the amount jumped to 35 %. However, as in Ecuador, subnational budgets are
based on transfers that come with strong national restrictions on their use (Proyecto
29 Scholars have linked recent decentralization to neoliberalism and democratization, for instance, expect-
ing that neoliberals prefer decentralization as a means of reducing the size of the central state and that under
democracy voters who want decentralization will push for it (Eaton 2004, see especially 11 and 14–15).
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Fig. 1 Local third-party financing of armed forces in post-transition, neoliberal settings
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USAID/Perú Prodescentralización 2011, pp. 93–94). On top of those transfers, Peru’s
“canon” system assigns hydrocarbon- and mineral-rich subnational political units
50 % of the tax revenue from investments in the hydrocarbon and mining sectors
(Kuramoto 2008, p. 16; Arellano Yanguas 2011, p. 41), but those transfers are
earmarked for capital spending (Ahmad and García-Escribano 2008, p. 7).
Conclusion
This article contributes to our understanding of state accountability, including state
capture, in resource-rich regions that confront neoliberal economic reforms and
struggles to democratize. The analysis of the Peruvian and Ecuadorian armies
suggests that, as predicted by research on security privatization, civil–military rela-
tions, and natural resource conflict, democratization and neoliberal reform have
pressed militaries to sell their security services to private clients while also interfering
with that entrepreneurship. The article has resolved this tension by highlighting weak
government control of army behavior in remote areas, where local army–client
contracting has continued being pervasive.
The detailed examination of the Ecuadorian and Peruvian cases demonstrates vividly
private-sector capture of the military, distracting the latter from its public duties. That
clients exercise local influence on each army shows us that, ultimately, army priorities
have been alarmingly far-removed from policy goals set in the capital city, painting a
grim picture for state accountability in the region. This capture constitutes a particular
instance of a phenomenon theorized by Guillermo O’Donnell in his work on the
“spirals” by which Latin American state bureaucracies lose effectiveness and legitimacy
in countries experiencing neoliberal reform. Part of this story is “a perverse kind of
privatization,”whereby local private powers capture the public sector in Latin America’s
“brown areas” (O’Donnell 1993, pp. 1359, 1363–1367).
The Indonesia–Nigeria analysis moves us toward a more inclusive theory of local
military entrepreneurship. As expected, based on the Latin American cases, a lack of
government control of military financial practices at all levels has meant that the TNI
and Nigeria’s armed forces have not used local deals to escape national-level control.
However, demand from companies in the powerful extractive industries and from
recently endowed subnational governments have encouraged local military–client
contracting.
This research puts forth evidence that, from Latin America to Africa to Asia, armed
forces have participated in local security markets that have grown in salience and that
revolve in important ways around private hydrocarbon and mining companies. Those
actors, historically powerful in the developing world, have only gained influence; the
predominant shift toward liberal economic models has increased countries’ reliance on
their extractive industries. Future scholarship on security in countries rich in natural
resources therefore should take seriously military behavior at the local level and more
generally local interactions among security providers and financiers. One crucial future
avenue of research would be to examine in more detail the competition among different
state and nonstate security forces that vie for contracts, to describe and explain the rise of
these local securitymarkets, and to explore their implications for violence, development,
resource production, and public as opposed to private security.
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